a country is an intimate one and as such, despite numerous general resemblances, national insolvency laws and procedures differ significantly.
Over the last decades, the increasing frequency and extent of European cross-border insolvency cases have exposed the limitations of the existing body of law in this field, both at national and EU levels. When one examines the parts of each country's private international law dealing with insolvency, the conflicting views are even more deeply-rooted than in any other types of conflict of laws.
II. Outline
This paper generally focuses on the efforts at EU level to provide a legal framework for dealing with cross-border bankruptcies, notably through the European Council Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings of 2000. It explores the issue of the harmonisation of corporate insolvency and rescue law at European level, and the tensions between different solutions for the reform of cross-border insolvency and business rescue.
The first section examines the adequacy of the existing rules against the framework of EU law, as the Regulation was adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty. It will be determined whether the legal basis chosen for the harmonisation of insolvency law within the EU was the most suitable option, and whether the choice of this form of regulation effectively promotes the proper functioning of the Internal Market.
Secondly, the paper looks at the specific issue of primary and secondary proceedings, since the Regulation was oriented more towards facilitating liquidation than rehabilitation. This section is located within the broader doctrinal distinction between universal and territorial approaches to resolution of international conflict of laws.
Finally, the latest European reforms are considered. More than ten years after the adoption of the Regulation, the European Commission has linked its amendment with the EU's current primary concern of promoting economic recovery and sustainable growth. The paper examines the 
B. Purpose of the European Insolvency Regulation
The EIR therefore sought to introduce rules for dealing with insolvencies with a cross-border element, particularly because companies' international activities profoundly impact the economy of the EU. A need for regulation by common rules applicable throughout the Single Market was quickly realised, with the result that only a supranational measure co-ordinating European proceedings was deemed to have the necessary weight to harmonise insolvency law. The aim was to create a level playing field and to remove unequal domestic barriers.
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The preamble and the thirty-three paragraphs of the EIR describe the objectives that justified an action at European level, establishing a procedure that is directly applicable in the Member States.
Generally, the preamble and Recitals therein refer to the stated global aim of the EU, i.e. to create a single legal area based on the ideals of freedom, security and justice. 5 Thus, the essential purposes of the EIR are:
(1) to allow for the proper functioning of the Internal Market, which requires efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings;
(2) to coordinate the measures taken over the insolvent debtor's assets; and (3) to avoid forum shopping.
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The EIR is the product of a long and complex negotiation process. A more coherent body of substantive insolvency law at EU level could not be created because of the numerous disparities between national insolvency laws. 6 Thus, the EIR stands as an instrument harmonising procedural law exclusively, and rests on the provisions governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings. In many respects, the Regulation can be regarded purely as a mechanism for dealing with the kinds of difficulties raised under conflict of law principles, i.e. choice of forum and choice of law, as it does not seek to harmonise insolvency law across jurisdictions in any way. The
Regulation focuses on the facilitation of reciprocal recognition and enforcement of insolvency proceedings.
C. Jurisdictional Issues under the Regulation

The Universalism vs Territorialism Paradigm
In order to achieve proper functioning within the Internal Market, two approaches have traditionally been deployed to solve the issues generated by cross-border insolvencies: "universality" and "territoriality."
The main principle underlying the EIR is that of the "universality" of insolvency proceedings. This principle requires that when insolvency proceedings are commenced in relation to a debtor, then those proceedings should compromise all of that debtor's assets, wherever they may be located in the Member States, and that no further insolvency proceedings should be permitted to be commenced. However, most European States have implemented a mixed model, generally referred to as "modified" universality, which the EIR has similarly, and appropriately, adopted.
Article 3(2) proceedings are limited in effect to the particular Member State in which they are commenced and are subject to rules of coordination with the main proceedings. Nevertheless, they represent a major incursion on the principle of universality. There is in principle no limit on the number of Article 3(2) proceedings which may be commenced; if a debtor has a number of establishments in different Member States then a corresponding number of territorial insolvency proceedings can be commenced in each of those states.
The second main important element is that Article 3(2) insolvency proceedings can be commenced even if main insolvency proceedings have previously been commenced in relation to the debtor. State where the debtor has its COMI, may be problematic in practice. The initiation of secondary proceedings introduces multiple insolvency proceedings in relation to the debtor which will inevitably lead to increased costs and may also prejudice the successful achievement of the purposes of the main insolvency proceedings.
To conclude, the phenomenon of cross-border insolvencies is comprised of competing rights and interests, competing forms and competing laws. Neither universalism nor territorialism is considered to be adequate in the context of a European commerce framework. The EIR therefore melds the two concepts into what is called "modified" universalism, "a system of satellite secondary bankruptcies which revolve around and give assistance to a main core proceeding." 10
Modified Universalism in the EIR and the Concept of the "Centre of Main Interest"
In the EU, insolvency law is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States, but the EIR has introduced a unified choice-of-law and choice-of-forum model, since these are not at the disposal of the debtor company. The EIR combines this approach with the universality principle.
Despite its prospective wide scope, Recital 11 of the EIR acknowledges that different bankruptcy laws are applied across the Member States, rendering it difficult to introduce proceedings with pure universal breadth, encompassing the whole of the debtor's assets. 11 The philosophy behind the enactment of the EIR was that a harmonised body of bankruptcy law with pan-European extraterritorial effects was more effective than a collection of disparate national proceedings in terms of returns for the various stakeholders, particularly creditors. Nonetheless, because of the differing political views across the EU, such a comprehensive harmonisation did not occur, and the EIR was therefore not based on a purely universalist model. The decision to open secondary proceedings is usually brought about where: (1) secondary proceedings benefit local creditors, and: (2) main proceedings cannot be opened under the law of the Member State where the debtor's COMI is located. These restrictive rules have the advantage of concentrating assets for creditors' distribution, rather than of allowing for the opening of territorial proceedings in any jurisdiction. This latter scenario would be detrimental as it would dissipate the assets on costs and fees, since several proceedings, in several courts of different countries would be opened at the same time.
From the above, it is clear that the possibility of opening territorial proceedings in two or more jurisdictions with different bankruptcy laws means that this universal model has been partially eroded and abandoned, and replaced by a "modified" universality approach.
Conclusion: Main Drawbacks of European Insolvency Law
The EIR has established a uniform procedural framework regarding the opening of insolvency proceedings. It makes provision for a mandatory set of jurisdictional rules, thereby enhancing the harmonisation of insolvency law provisions. It improves harmonisation notably because of its direct applicability in the different Member States, ie its automatic binding effects in all Member States, without requiring any transposition through domestic legislation. Based on the above explanation, it can be argued that the Regulation has played a significant role in the development of a harmonised set of insolvency rules, governing cross-border insolvency cases. Nevertheless, despite this commitment to uniformity and unity, some significant drawbacks persist, which have diminished the overall impact of the Regulation.
First, the choice of the EIR's legal basis, Title IV of the EC Treaty, was not the most appropriate in terms of the uniform application of bankruptcy law in the EU, as three Member States (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) secured opt-out provisions.
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Secondly, the Member State in which the debtor company has its COMI is competent to govern the main insolvency proceedings, and the law of this country will be applied to all creditors and assets, regardless of their location. This is of great importance because this Member State will be competent also to regulate distribution criteria. Nonetheless, even though the EIR states that the COMI is where the debtor "conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties," the EIR did not reach its initial goal of creating a wellordered system granting legal certainty. First, a number of exceptions to the rule of the COMI are 17 The United Kingdom and Ireland have since exercised their right to opt-in.
provided for in the EIR, so as to preserve Member States' interests in regulating local issues and assets. Additionally, the evolution of EU case law on companies' freedom of establishment has allowed different forms of forum shopping to develop.
IV. Corporate Mobility, Regulatory Arbitrage and Insolvency Law
At its very core, the objective of the EIR was to avoid forum shopping. Despite this goal, two assumptions were inferred by the EIR drafters: (1) European firms do not substantially spread their activities outside their home State and, therefore, their COMI would be easily determined;
(2) European firms could not reincorporate from one Member State to another without first liquidating the business. These hypotheses are no longer realistic, however, notably due to the process of European integration, and the development of EU law providing for the freedom of establishment of corporations. These developments have placed the EIR in a functional crisis.
Company law and insolvency law interact with each other to form coherent regulatory systems at a national level. Nevertheless, the increase in corporate mobility has the potential to tear these systems apart as inconsistencies in the application of private international rules fail to create a complete regulatory framework. European companies have competitively expanded their activities across the EU. This needs to be celebrated as a success of market integration -a step towards the Single Internal Market. However, the situation needs to be carefully regulated because this extension of activities increases uncertainties as to the location of a corporation's COMI due to the vagueness surrounding single internal market regulation. If the presumption regarding the location of the COMI is not rebutted, the same Member State will be competent to deal with both company and insolvency issues. However, this provides legal certainty only insofar as discrepancies between the registered office and the real COMI are limited and cross-border mobility of the registered office is made difficult. In light of the interconnectivity of businesses today, the development of EU law and the evolution of ECJ case law, these assertions are neither accurate nor pragmatic, especially given the description of corporate mobility as "the very essence of the internal market," the heart of European company law. the fragmented and uncertain pre-EIR system, the regime has been welcomed as a positive innovation in terms of cross-border bankruptcies. European insolvencies have become more predictable, not least due to the modified universality model having introduced more clarity.
However, the EIR did not harmonise substantive insolvency laws within the EU. Instead, the Regulation confined itself to harmonising procedural international rules regarding conflicts of law in insolvency matters. This is due to the fact that domestic insolvency regimes touch upon a multitude of individual rights and a balance must be struck between protecting creditors' rights and safeguarding debtors' interests. Consequently, the scope of the EIR was limited to how such rules were to be implemented and administered at a national level, as opposed to the substance of rules that would be passed.
Additionally, as it fails to make provision for the insolvency of groups of companies and lacks a clear definition for the concept of COMI, the Regulation renders the coordination of proceedings difficult to organise and ultimately hinders corporate rescue. As Professor Ian Fletcher observed,
[i]nternational insolvency law has arrived at the threshold of an exciting period of development… There is now a necessity to build bridges between the individual national systems, and to create adaptable structures that will enable communication and cooperation to take place in response to the particular elements present within each case -
[this], requires a new vision, and new modes of thought, from all participants.
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B. Substance of the Reform
In the EU, the focus is now placed on rescue. In March 2014 the Commission adopted a
Recommendation outlining a series of common principles for national insolvency procedures for businesses in financial difficulty. The objective is to shift the focus away from liquidation towards encouraging viable businesses to restructure at an early stage so as to prevent insolvency. outcome and this conflicts with the EU objective of helping ailing companies to recover.
Therefore, the aim of the 2014 Recommendation was to implement frameworks that strengthen the rescue culture of viable companies:
[e]vidence suggests that failed entrepreneurs learn from their mistakes and are generally more successful the second time around. Up to 18% of all entrepreneurs who go on to be successful have failed in their first venture.
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The Recommendation primarily addressed two critical points: (1) the prevention of failures and (2) the concept of a second-chance, i.e. the possibility for a failing business to recover and be offered growth, a higher investment rate and the preservation of employment," as determined in the Europe 2020 strategy. In evaluating the practical application of the European Insolvency Regulation, the Commission acknowledged that while it is generally considered to operate successfully in facilitating cross-border insolvency proceedings within the EU, some issues concerning its functioning emerged. Specifically, "[i]t does not sufficiently reflect current EU priorities and national practices in insolvency law, in particular in promoting the rescue of firms in difficulty." 37 Recently, in March 2014, the Commission adopted a Recommendation regarding a new approach to business failure and insolvency, emphasising that Member States will have to enact further insolvency law procedures to facilitate the restructuring of businesses. 38 According to the Commission, a business, which initiates restructuring soon rather later, will have lower costs and a higher success rate. The Commission also noted that during the adoption of restructuring plans, creditors should be involved, especially those individuals who are likely to be affected by the plan and to encourage new financing. Finally, the Commission recommended giving more power to judicial bodies, which need to ensure that dissenting creditors do not face greater loss than they would have in the alternative scenario.
It has been noted that the Recommendation can be viewed from two angles. First, it may be seen as a politically expedient way to try and deal with the issues, while there is not yet enough support shared across the Member States to publish a legally binding directive or regulation. Secondly, however, the current reforms in some insolvency laws (e.g. those of France, the Netherlands, and Spain) may be an indicator that some kind of harmonisation of insolvency law across EU Member
States is taking place.
C. Evaluation of the New Regulation 2015/848
On 20 proceedings. This marks the end of a revision process which started with the Commission's proposal of 12 December 2012.
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The primary aim of the revision was to improve the operation of the EIR with a view to ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market and its resilience in economic crises, having regard to national insolvency laws and to the case law of the ECJ on the old Insolvency Regulation.
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The general impression is that the system created by the EIR works well overall, and that an extensive reform is not needed. Indeed, reform could instead be destabilising. However, it is clear that partial revision is beneficial for improving the practical operation of the Regulation. In short, the strategy, and to the EU's current political priorities of promoting economic recovery and sustainable growth, encouraging a higher investment rate, and preserving employment.
Nevertheless, the reform is quite limited since it affects procedural, rather than substantive change. Essentially, it is confined to the extension of the existing Europe-wide recognition of a larger category of restructuring proceedings, in particular pre-insolvency mechanisms.
The Commission has not departed from the framework of the existing Regulation, and the proposals do not divert from the current regime too much. The European Union is taking action to promote economic recovery, boost investment and safeguard employment. It is a high political priority to take measures to create sustainable growth and prosperity.
VI. Conclusion
Regarding proposals for reform of cross-border insolvency in the EU, typically two opposing arguments are presented: on the one hand, whether there ought to be a community commitment to reach full harmonisation of insolvency law, and on the other, whether companies ought to be granted the scope to choose the insolvency law of their preference. The latter is referred to as the "choice model." Neither solution has been recommended by EU institutions in their amendment
project, yet they shed some light on potential developments.
For efficiency reasons, some legal commentators have pointed out that regulatory arbitrage and forum shopping need to be regulated in a transparent way, and should not to be uniformly prohibited, as the current Regulation requires. It is believed that under such a "choice model," companies would not be bound by inefficient domestic proceedings, but instead, could opt for another Member State's more efficient legislation, or, if such foreign law allowed, a restructuring could be made impossible under the original national law. Companies could then make use of the legal diversity available across the EU and avoid inefficient domestic procedures.
To implement such a choice model in the EU, two options are available. The first solution would involve disregarding the applicable company law and allowing free choice of insolvency law to companies. The second possibility, more popular among legal scholars, would be to replace the introduce more predictability ex ante for creditors, who would be better able to predict the legal rules and therefore adjust the cost of credit more efficiently.
However, the choice model is not without its weaknesses. This is because a company, by choosing the applicable insolvency law, would change its risk profile, having previously been taken into account by the creditors when negotiating the credit contract. This should not pose a problem for adjusting creditors who can protect themselves through covenants or guarantees, yet nonadjusting creditors may be at a real disadvantage because they cannot adjust the terms of their loan to reflect the effect on them of this choice of bankruptcy law. Thus, although this "choice model" produces several advantages, notably the possibility for companies to choose the most efficient regulation, it also introduces legitimacy issues and comes at a substantial social cost.
A fully harmonised body of insolvency law would, on the other hand, block negative externalities generated by the Member States' national legislations. Under the current Regulation, the Member State in which the debtor's COMI is located has jurisdiction over the matter and its legislation applies to assets and creditors, even those situated in another Member State. This situation can produce negative externalities, specifically by causing negative economic outcomes for Member
States' non-parties to the insolvency issue at stake, and more generally by producing widespread spillover effects.
As such, full harmonisation of corporate insolvency law would be a desirable choice, and it is further justified by the subsidiarity principle underpinning EU law. If certain issues are better dealt with at supranational level, the EU is given competence in the matter and harmonisation is justified by the need to internalise negative externalities. Spillover effects would be avoided by implementing identical rules regarding creditors' priorities across the EU, so that all creditors would know ex ante and with certainty, which principles apply in case of default. By leaving the issue of full harmonisation of corporate insolvency to the EU, European policy-makers would certainly have to consider the interests of non-adjusting creditors, in order to obtain their political support.
Yet full harmonisation is not always perceived as the best solution either, notably because European populations' preferences are heterogeneous, and vary greatly from one Member State to another. In these cases smaller territorial units may be better equipped to address local interests and needs.
What is more, full harmonisation of insolvency law does not seem possible under the current EU legislative mechanisms. The so-called "democratic deficit" of European institutions and the EU decision-making mechanism raise scepticism about the potential of EU institutions to enact redistributive insolvency laws. Pursuant to the TFEU, instruments related to the harmonisation of laws should be adopted following the ordinary legislative procedure, 41 which requires negotiations between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, and reflects the dual basis of democratic legitimacy in the EU institutions, i.e. involving both the Member States through the Commission and the Council, and the citizens through the European Parliament. The complex voting process calls for a broad consensus to be reached among Member States, and due to the nature of insolvency law, the harmonisation of such rules is quite likely to protect strong interests groups, i.e. those able to bargain at the highest EU level.
Thus, a fully harmonised body of EU corporate insolvency law will most likely alter the manner in which Member States currently balance values and interests. This could hinder the process of total harmonisation, which, ultimately, is not only an issue of efficiency, but mainly of politics and European integration.
